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Abstract 
Both paleobiology and investigations of ‘major evolutionary transitions’ are intimately 
concerned with the macroevolutionary shape of life. It is surprising, then, how little 
paleontological perspectives and evidence inform studies of major transitions. I argue that this 
disconnect is partially justified because paleobiological investigation is typically ‘phenomena-led’, 
while investigations of major transitions (at least as commonly understood) are ‘theory-led’. The 
distinction turns on evidential relevance: in the former case, evidence is relevant in virtue of its 
relationship to some phenomena or hypotheses that concern those phenomena; in the latter, 
evidence is relevant in virtue of providing insights into, or tests of, an abstract body of theory. 
Because paleobiological data is by-and-large irrelevant to the theory which underwrites the 
traditional conception of major transitions, it is of limited use to that research program. I suggest 
that although the traditional conception of major transitions is neither ad-hoc or problematically 
incomplete, its promise of providing unificatory explanations of the transitions is unlikely to be 
kept. Further, examining paleobiological investigations of mass extinctions and organogenesis, I 
further argue that (1) whether or not transitions in paleobiology count as ‘major’  turns on how 
we conceive of major transitions (that is, the notion is sensitive to investigative context) ; (2) 
although major transitions potentially have a unified theoretical basis, recent developments 
suggest that investigations are becoming increasingly phenomena-led; (3) adopting phenomena-
led investigations maximizes the evidence available to paleobiologists. 
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1. Introduction 
A body of work in evolutionary biology understands life’s history by positing crucial, game-
changing events—major transitions—which explain patterns in the diversity, complexity and 
disparity of life. Paleobiologists also care deeply about the events and processes which shape 
life’s trajectory on the macro-scale, and posit events—mass extinctions for instance—which play 
similarly game-changing roles. These discussions are oddly disjoint: in particular, evolutionary 
theorists concerned with major transitions don’t attend in detail to paleobiological evidence or 
paleobiological theorizing. If their subject-matter or interests overlap this is surprising.  
There are many reasons why research programmes fail to be in dialogue. Institutional 
differences often play a role. The major transitions literature is firmly rooted in evolutionary 
biology, while mass extinctions are studied by paleobiologists, and flow between these 
disciplines (particularly from the latter to the former) is rare. Further, although both projects are 
interested in ‘the shape of life’ in some general sense, their actual explanatory targets often 
differ. Where the paleobiologist is interested in patterns as revealed by the fossil record, 
evolutionary biologists target patterns in living biota. Such factors surely play their part in 
explaining the lack of flow from paleobiology into major transitions.  I’m going to argue that this 
disconnect is revelatory of a difference in how paleobiologists on the one hand, and some 
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evolutionary theorists on the other, approach questions about macroevolution. As we’ll see, 
evolutionary theorists attempt to provide a theory-led explanation of life’s shape. Abstract details 
of the basic mechanics of evolution are front and explanatorily centre. This leads to a particular 
methodological strategy: explaining how minimally specified systems might evolve the 
properties associated with major transitions. By contrast, paleobiological investigations are often 
phenomena-led. They are primarily concerned with actual patterns in the fossil record, and how 
these are revelatory of the biological, geological and environmental processes which generate 
such patterns. As such, their methodological strategy is much more diverse, bringing to bear a 
wide range of evidential sources.  
This paper is not simply about the lack of discussion between paleobiology and neontology: 
indeed, you might not be surprised at that. Rather, examining the differences between how 
paleobiologists approach macroevolution and how evolutionary theorists approach major 
transitions reveals two different ways of investigating life at the broadest of scales. 
In addition to shedding light on the relationship between paleobiology and neontological 
investigation of major transitions, I’ll suggest that the phenomena -led nature of paleobiology 
brings insights concerning paleobiological success. There is an occasional pessimistic streak 
regarding the epistemic power of paleobiology (and the historical sciences more generally): 
given that experiments are of limited relevance, and that the deep past’s signal is often biased, 
degraded and incomplete, we shouldn’t expect paleobiology to be as successful as, say, 
‘experimental’ sciences (see, especially, Turner 2007). More optimistic conceptions emphasize 
the ‘disunified’ and ‘opportunistic’ method historical scientists adopt, especially Alison Wylie 
(1999, 2002, Chapman & Wylie 2016) and myself (Currie 2016, 2018). I’ll argue that the 
phenomena-led character of paleobiology helps explain the nature of this disunified strategy and 
why it is adopted. 
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I’ll begin with first passes at both major transitions and mass extinctions, before 
characterizing ‘phenomena-led’ and ‘theory-led’ investigations. I’ll then revisit major transitions 
and argue for a context-sensitive conception. That will underwrite a discussion of how transitions 
are treated in paleobiology (illustrated by both mass extinctions and the evolution of vertebrate 
limbs). I’ll finish with a discussion of how conducting phenomena-led investigations contributes 
to the success of historical reconstruction. In the conclusion, I’ll make a few comments about the 
relationship between paleobiology and neontology.  
2. Major Transitions 
Life might unfold gradually, or it could be shaped by game-changing events. Maynard-Smith 
and Szathmary (1997) called such events major transitions, and identified two types. First, shifts in 
the mechanisms of inheritance (that is, in information-transmission); second, the emergence of 
new levels of individuality. The invention of sex enabled genetic recombination via meiosis; multi-
cellularity enabled significantly increased mechanistic specialization. Events like these are 
important not simply because of the magnitude of the changes they wrought, but because of the 
nature of those changes: they alter the space of evolutionary possibility itself. As Calcott and 
Sterelny put it: 
Instead of conceptualizing life as evolving through a fixed, though immense, space of 
organic design, and asking how that space is explored over time, Maynard-Smith and 
Szathmary conceived of the space of biological possibility as itself evolving. (Calcott & 
Sterelny 2013, 4). 
A major transition, then, involves a shift in biological possibility. For instance, there are basic 
limitations on how large a single-celled organism can be. By banding single cells together, multi-
cellular organisms can achieve much greater sizes. In transitioning from a single-celled mode to a 
multi-cellular mode, then, different areas of possibility space become occupiable.  
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Why do Maynard-Smith and Szathmary focus on the events they do? They are aware that 
there are other important events in life’s history: 
[We] have not included major phenotypic changes, such as the conquest of land by plants 
and animals, or the origin of vision, or of flight or of homeothermy, which did not involve 
such a change in the method of information transmission. (1997, 6) 
What is so important about information transmission and the emergence of new evolutionary 
individuals? On Calcott & Sterelny’s reading (2011), what makes a major transition major is that it 
involves modifying “…core elements of the evolutionary process itself” (4).  It is thought that 
there are minimal conditions for a population to be subject to evolutionary forces (Lewontin 
1970, Godfrey-Smith 2009). Say, for adaptations to accumulate there must be sufficiently high-
fidelity transmission of traits across generations. A major transition has profound effects in virtue 
of modifying these core elements. Heredity via cloning generates a different set of dynamics than 
heredity via sex, and this explains why life’s shape differs for cloning populations and sexual 
populations.  
This underwrites a view of life’s shape that is both punctuated and contingent. ‘Punctuated’ 
because between major transitions, life obeys a set of rules governed by some basic dynamics; 
life’s shape radically alters only when those dynamics shift. An old business-as-usual is replaced 
with a new business-as-usual. ‘Contingent’ because there is often nothing inevitable about the 
occurrence of major transitions—the right conditions must hold, and these are not guaranteed, 
and moreover the mechanisms which underwrite and generate the core evolutionary dynamics 
are themselves multiply realizable (“Different mechanisms may be involved in the origin and the 
maintenance of higher-level organization” Maynard-Smith & Szathmary, 9). 
Maynard-Smith and Szathmary made explicit an explanatory regime based on the unity they 
see in the major transitions they identify: the emergence of new units of selection.  
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Why did natural selection, acting on entities at the lower level (replicating molecules, 
free-living prokaryotes, asexual protists, single cells, individual organisms), disrupt 
integration at the higher level (chromosomes, eukaryotic cells, sexual species, 
multicellular organisms, societies)? It is because there is this common question that we 
have found it illuminating to compare the different transitions. (Maynard-Smith & 
Szathmary 1997, 7). 
And the kind of question Maynard-Smith & Szathmary propose is amenable to analysis via the 
abstract explanatory machinery of population genetics, game theory, and the like. We explain 
how the inherent selfishness of individuals are overcome in order for a common fate to emerge. 
Sharing a common fate makes cooperation of various stripes fitness-enhancing, and thus so too 
mechanisms which dampen cheaters. Under the right conditions, these can underwrite the 
emergence of a new evolutionary individual, itself consisting of previously competing parts.  
Maynard-Smith and Szathmary’s work has provided much fodder for philosophers and 
theoretically-inclined scientists. Common questions concern the unity or otherwise of major 
transitions (McShea & Simpson 2011, O’Malley & Powell 2016), characterizing the kind of 
explanations involved (Calcott 2011), and so on. These discussions will matter later, but for now 
let’s consider what evidence might be relevant to understanding major transitions. 
At the opening of The Major Transitions of Evolution, Maynard-Smith and Szathmary discuss a 
crucial epistemic question: how might we test claims about major transitions? The evidential 
sources they don’t mention are telling. 
There are obvious difficulties in discussing unique events that happened a long time ago 
… [however] we have agreed theories both of chemistry and of the mechanism of 
evolutionary change. We can therefore insist that our explanations be plausible both 
chemically, and in terms of natural selection. This places a severe constraint on possible 
theories… Further, theories are often testable by looking at existing organ isms. 
(Maynard-Smith & Szathmary 1997, 3) 
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Maynard-Smith and Szathmary appeal to theoretical constraints and neontological evidence 
in defending the epistemic tractability of their explanatory program. The experimental approach 
involves using animal models to simulate transitions under artificial conditions (c.f., Godfrey-
Smith 2006). Theoretical modelling results both inform us about possibility under constraints and 
are used to generate explanations of how major transitions occur.  Paleontological evidence is a 
glaring omission. First, paleobiologists, as we’ll see below, are clearly concerned with 
understanding life’s shape at the macro-level. Second, presumably fossils and other 
paleobiological evidential fodder are relevant to ‘unique events that happened a long time ago’. 
Third, today’s living biota are but a tiny speck in the ocean of deep time: their representativeness, 
their capacity to tell us much about the past without supplementation or integration with fossil 
data, can be questioned (Marshall 2017). This motivates a switch in topic: let’s consider how 
paleobiologists go about understanding life’s shape.  
3. Mass Extinctions 
Paleobiologists have much to like and dislike about Maynard-Smith and Szathmary’s picture. 
The contingency and punctuated nature of major transitions is reassuring; the gene-centric 
adaptationism less so1. Like Maynard-Smith and Szathmary, paleobiologists often see life as 
shaped by game-changing events. However, they pick out quite different transitions. Here, I’ll 
focus on one class of these: mass extinctions (later on we’ll meet another set concerning the 
evolution of vertebrate limbs). 
Just as death is part of an individual’s life, so too is extinction part of the life of a species. In 
individual populations there are continual deaths (and births); in the fossil record there is a 
‘background’ rate of extinction-events (and speciation events). However, there are spikes against 
                                                           
1 Paleobiologists are a diverse lot, including plenty of deterministic gradualists and gene-centric 
determinists, but in my experience there are certainly less of them than you’d find amongst neontologists.  
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these backgrounds. An enormous spike in the rate of human death occurred at the beginning of 
the Colombian exchange in the 16th Century (Crosby 2003); for dinosaur-species, an extinction-
spike occurred around 66 million years ago. These spikes—mass extinctions—have mattered to 
paleobiologists at least since the early 1980s. Studies of mass extinctions concern (1) empirically 
characterizing the patterns in the fossil record, (2) determining the biological or geological nature 
of the signals, (3) considering processes or mechanisms which could generate those patterns, (4) 
considering the implications of such events for life’s shape (see Currie 2018 chapter 7, section 
7.1.2). 
Fischer & Arthur (1977) and Raup & Sepkoski (1983) used statistical analyses of the 
appearance and disappearance of marine fossils to challenge the view that extinction should be 
modelled as a gradual, continual process. They thus characterized a pattern in the fossil record 
(one assumed, with good reason, to be biological). Raup & Sepkoski in particular claimed to have 
uncovered 12 spikes and suggested that these occurred periodically on a 26 million-year cycle. 
With the pattern in place, processes or mechanisms were then hypothesized. Raup & Sepkoski 
contrast biotic causes with “… recurrent events or cycles in the physical environment” (805), 
suggesting that extra-terrestrial events could explain the periodicity2. In light of such 
mechanisms, they drew macroevolutionary considerations: 
The implications of periodicity for evolutionary biology are profound. The most obvious is 
that the evolutionary system is not “alone” in the sense that it is partially dependent 
upon external influences more profoundly than the local and regional environmental 
changes normally considered. (805) 
                                                           
2 Note that it is no longer thought plausible that extra-terrestrial impacts commonly cause mass 
extinctions. That appears to be particular to the K-Pg extinction (Schulte et al 2010). 
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That is, the biology-focused machinery of evolutionary theory is insufficient to explain life on 
the macro-scale, due to non-biological sources of contingency (McConwell & Currie 2017). 
Further, mass extinctions make a difference: 
With kill rates of species estimated to have been as high as 77% and 96% for the largest 
extinctions, the biosphere is forced through narrow bottlenecks and the recovery from 
these events is usually accompanied by fundamental changes in biotic composition. 
Without these perturbations, the general course of macroevolution could have been very 
different. (805) 
In Raup & Sepkoski’s foundational paper, then, the four features listed above are already 
more-or-less present. Since then, investigations of mass extinctions have become increasingly 
sophisticated and diverse. One development has been the use of simulations to theoretically 
probe the features of evolving lineages, including mass extinctions. As opposed to what we see 
in major transitions, such simulations are typically examined in combination with the fossil 
record. Another is the inclusion of increasing detail concerning the multitude of causes 
underwriting extinction spikes. By 2002, Erwin et al recognized that “… A full understanding of 
mass extinctions requires an integration of the details of the fossil record, changes in the 
chemistry of oceans and atmospheres, the tempo of extinction, and the distinction between 
triggers and mechanisms” (363).  
Mass extinctions, then, share features with major transitions. Most profoundly, they change 
the game: dramatic environmental shifts coupled with extreme biotic turnover affect which parts 
of possibility space may be occupied by the survivors’ descendants. However, examinations of 
mass extinctions draw on quite different evidential sources than studies of the major transitions. 
Further, mass extinctions are not considered major transitions. And, as stated in the introduction, 
paleobiological discussion of transitions does not appear to be in dialogue with the research 
program Maynard-Smith and Szathmary began. What gives? 
10 
 
4. Theory vs Phenomena Led Science 
Two central questions emerge from the discussion thus far. First, are mass extinctions major 
transitions? Second, what explains the absence of paleobiological evidence in the major 
transitions literature? The former question has, in a sense, an easy answer. To be a major vis-à-vis 
our discussion thus far, an event must constitutively alter the ‘core’ components of evolution. 
Although mass extinctions may facilitate such changes, they do not do so necessarily as, for 
instance, the emergence of new evolutionary individuals might. But why accept this definition? If 
Raup & Sepkoski are right, mass extinctions play a crucial role in the story of life’s shape: they’re 
major, even if they’re not major transitions. An answer to the latter question will illuminate the 
former. I’ll suggest that, once we understand what the major transitions literature is trying to 
do—its goal—we see that paleontological evidence is more-or-less irrelevant. In later sections, I’ll 
question whether major transitions as traditionally conceived succeeds in meeting aspects of 
that goal. 
Let’s distinguish between theory-led and phenomena-led investigations. Intuitively, the 
difference turns on whether the investigators are primarily interested in understanding general 
theories, or are interested in particular or recurrent events. In the major transitions approach, the 
main evidential and explanatory work is undertaken by evolutionary theory. At base, a minimal 
model of evolutionary populations is used, and alterations to that model provide explanations of 
macroevolutionary change (Calcott 2013). Further, the problems themselves are characterized in 
terms of those theoretical models: asking questions such as how populations of replicators might 
overcome their competition in becoming a new evolutionary individual. 
The theory-led nature of major transition investigation is evident throughout Calcott & 
Sterelny’s recent collected volume on the topic: 
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This emphasis [on evolutionary individuality] is reflected in the content of the current 
volume: The majority of the papers are concerned with some aspect of transitions in 
individuality. As we have suggested, there is a more expansive way to interpret these 
transitions—one that involves not just transitions in individuality, but any shift in the core 
components of the evolutionary process (8). 
We have, then, a model of evolutionary processes. It consists of some core components—
notions of ‘fitness’ or ‘replicability’, for instance. A major transition is a shift in those core 
components. It is presumed (I suppose via a proof-of-actuality!) that major transitions occurred, 
but precisely when, over what period of time, or via what actual mechanism or process, is largely 
irrelevant. What matters is understanding how a set of general problems pertaining to the 
possible occurrence of transitions between different evolutionary dynamics are overcome. 
Study of mass-extinctions is, by contrast, phenomena-led. The central concerns involve 
characterizing, finding evidence of, and explaining both particular events in the fossil record, and 
patterns across it. As such, timing, scale and actual mechanisms or processes are crucial to the 
questions being asked. As we saw, Raup & Sepkoski undertook a data-intensive, statistical 
analysis of the marine fossil record. This involved both gathering the data, generating 
phylogenetic organization, and then identifying spikes against background extinction rates. With 
this in place, hypotheses are posited about the causes of the mass extinctions and are tested 
using an array of empirical strategies. 
The distinction between phenomena-led and theory-led can be made precise by appeal to 
evidential relevance3. Ingo Brigandt (2010) and Alan Love (2006) argue that the explanatory or 
evidential role some information may play in an investigation depends on context, specifically the 
                                                           
3 The distinction between phenomena-led and theory-led investigations has close kin in Michael 
Weisberg’s (2006) distinction between ‘model-based’ and ‘abstract-direct representation’ (ADR) strategies 
in science. Like model-based strategies, theory-led investigations often involved conceiving of some 
phenomena abstractly, and investigating that phenomena using theoretical models. And like ADR, 
phenomena-led investigations often proceed by building an empirical picture of a phenomena via data 
collation. However, how we articulate these distinction is quite different, and phenomena-led 
investigations are a much broader category than Weisberg’s ADR.  
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‘problem agenda’ at hand. Problem agendas set criteria for explanatory adequacy, which govern 
the roles different evidence or data might play. Here’s Love on problem agendas: 
[a problem agenda] is a “list” of interrelated questions (both empirical and conceptual) 
that are united by some connection to natural phenomena. For example, how do 
questions concerning greenhouse  gas  contributions  from  plant  respiration,  along  with  
many other questions about emission-related phenomena (anthropogenic or otherwise),  
including  their  interaction  with  systematic  cycling  and  atmospheric dynamics, get 
answered with respect to global warming phenomena?  (877). 
Such problem agendas are structured by ‘general criteria of explanatory adequacy’ which set 
which kinds of questions should be answered (and how) within that agenda. Brigandt takes some 
lines of evidence to form the ‘core’ of a research agenda: they provision the explanation of the 
phenomena in question, while other lines of evidence play supporting roles. How this operates is 
best demonstrated via exemplar, so let’s turn again to our problem agendas: mass extinctions 
and major transitions as described in the previous two sections.  
Major transitions, as described thus far, is a problem agenda built around questions 
concerning the ‘rules’ of evolution: that is, how evolutionary individuals, populations and the 
mechanisms of heritability change over time. Questions include: how could a population of 
competing conspecifics overcome the temptation to defect? How do changes in pathways of 
heredity change evolutionary dynamics? Notice that the ‘phenomenon’ in this circumstance is 
theoretical: it concerns the dynamics of evolutionary populations. 
What about the general criteria of explanatory adequacy in this domain? As we saw, 
Maynard-Smith and Szathmary point to the constraints of chemical and evolutionary theory on 
hypotheses of transitions, and use evolutionary theory to articulate their questions and their 
answers about heredity and individuality. The model-based explanations provisioned by 
evolutionary theory, then, form the ‘core’. Modeling is relevant because it reveals the nature of 
said theory; some neontological lab-based studies are relevant because they provide insight into 
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the capacities of systems meeting those minimal requirements. In contrast, the long-range, deep-
historical information about particular times and places, and patterns across times and places, 
which paleontology affords is largely irrelevant. After all, such information neither constrains nor 
provides insights into the behaviors of the minimal evolutionary systems with which the theory-
driven investigations of major transitions concern themselves.   
The problem agenda of mass extinctions includes questions about the periodicity or 
otherwise of spikes in extinction rates, to what extent the signal is geological or biological, what 
kinds of events enable or trigger mass extinctions, and questions about the downstream effects 
mass extinctions could have on the shape of life. General adequacy is here indexed to the pattern 
at hand (as opposed to some theory): data-gathering techniques and data-analysis matter, as do 
hypotheses about the fates of particular lineages, general trajectories, and the biotic and abiotic 
causes of extinctions. As such, the modeling and neontological studies favored by the major 
transitions folk are often valuable (particularly in hypothesizing about potential mechanisms or 
processes), but so also is long-range fossil and paleoclimatological evidence. 
So, we can distinguish between phenomena-led investigations, where the problem agenda 
appeals to some ‘phenomena’, that is, a possibly re-occurring occurrence that is observed or 
measured; and theory-led investigations, where the problem agenda appeals to a specific body of 
theory. It is important to note that this distinction is not the same as that traditionally drawn 
between ‘experimental’ and ‘theoretical’ science, or between ‘natural history’ and ‘nomothetic 
science’, or between ‘hypothesis-driven’ and ‘data-driven’ science. Phenomena-led investigations 
are rich in hypotheses, make use of theory (perhaps even laws!), and do not necessarily require 
extensive data-gathering prior to forming hypotheses; theory-led investigations are not 
necessarily impractical, divorced from the world, or speculative. The difference turns on whether 
it is phenomena or theory which set the problem agenda—provisions the explanatory core—and 
thus sets the criteria for adequacy. Continuing from this, the distinction doesn’t turn on the 
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intentions of scientists, but the structure of their investigations. Further, the distinction is not 
necessarily discrete nor complete: although some investigations may be more ‘purely’ 
phenomena- or theory-led, it is not part of my view that any particular investigation can be 
slotted neatly into either category. Note also that investigations may be dynamic regarding their 
being theory-led or phenomena-led: one may shift between the two. In fact, I’ll provide some 
reason to think this is happening for major transitions below. 
With this distinction on the table, we can restate a preliminary result: By my analysis, 
paleontological evidence is not included in discussion of major transitions for good reason. For 
theory-led investigations, evidence is relevant when it provides constraints on both how a 
minimal system ought to be specified, and on the capacities of those systems. For phenomena-
led investigations, evidential relevance is due to explanatory features of the phenomena at hand. 
The theory-led nature of the major transitions literature renders much paleontological evidence 
irrelevant. 
5. Narrow & Broad Conceptions of Major Transitions 
Since Maynard-Smith & Szathmary’s original publication, conceptual discussion of major 
transitions centred on a tension between the desire for a unified or theoretically grounded 
notion and a desire for completeness—that is, to capture the events which in fact shaped life. In 
this section, I offer a way of understanding these differences, and critically examine various 
responses to that tension. 
Distinguish between sources and outcomes. The ‘source’ of a transition is the kind of event 
which underwrites it: the emergence of a new individual, say. The ‘outcome’ of a transition is the 
macro-evolutionary pattern which emerges in light of that event: the radiation of a lineage, say 
(the distinction between ‘source’ and ‘outcome’ is from McConwell & Currie 2017). Conceptions 
of major transitions can be restricted via constraining the admissible sources or admissible 
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outcomes. In their original formulation, Maynard-Smith & Szathmary provided a fairly narrow 
account. Only macro-evolutionary events caused by the emergence of new individuals, or new 
means of transmission, counted. Okasha and some others (Okasha 2005, Michod 2007) restrict 
transitions even further: to the emergence of new individuals alone. Specifying a relatively small 
set of sources enables the accounts’ theoretical unity, and thus its capacity to be theory-led. 
There is a cost however: many events which certainly mattered deeply for life’s h istory do not 
count as major transitions, and for some the unity achieved isn’t sufficient. Szathmary himself 
attempts to develop a broader account (2015) while attempting to retain theoretical unity, while 
Maureen O’Malley and Russell Powell (2016) adopt a yet more permissive account which includes 
differences in metabolic processes. On my view, the way into major transitions implied by Calcott 
& Sterelny above does suggest a theoretically-unified, relatively narrow way of conceiving of 
major transitions. Most discussions focus on sources but, as we’ll see, I suspect a tacit restriction 
on outcomes operates in the traditional view. I’ll first respond to a set of objections which claim 
that the traditional approach to major transitions is either incomplete or ad-hoc, before turning 
to what I think is a more pressing objection. 
5.1 Ad-hoc & Incomplete? 
Commentators complain about the apparent ‘hodge-podge’ of events identified in the 
original major transitions (McShea & Simpson 2011, Ågren 2014, O’Malley & Powell 2016)—the 
objection being that the inclusion or exclusion of events is ad-hoc. Surely a list including such 
disparate events as the emergence of cultural societies and multi-cellular organisms is disunified, 
after all, the inclusion of these quite different events requires different justifications. This is too 
quick. If major transitions are supposed to be game-changing vis-à-vis evolutionary theory, then 
an event’s inclusion turns on it altering core evolutionary mechanics. For Maynard-Smith & 
Szathmary’s original view, those mechanics were conceived of in a fairly traditional way: a 
population undergoes evolution just when individuals in that population (1) have traits of 
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differing fitness which (2) are heritable. The emergence of new individuals opens the door to new 
traits, and new pathways of heredity (or information-transmission more generally) can alter 
evolutionary dynamics. Insofar as those criteria are unified via that conception of evolutionary 
processes, they are no hodge-podge. So, the charge of ad-hocness strikes me as under-motived. 
O’Malley and Powell stress two senses in which ‘major transitions’ are incomplete: 
(1) Missing events that do not fit the… criterion, but which are so transformative from a 
macroevolutionary perspective that they must be included, and (2) missing events that fit 
the… criterion, but which nonetheless have been excluded... (166) 
In other words, first, some events are not game-changers vis-à-vis the rules of evolution, but 
surely are game-changers vis-à-vis life’s history. O’Malley and Powell emphasize the great 
oxygenation event: the evolution of photosynthesis transformed global climates from anaerobic-
favoring to aerobic-favoring. “Oxygenic photosynthesis is a biological innovation that altered in a 
sustained way the selective regimes and evolutionary trajectories of the main branches of the 
tree of life” (168). This enormous metabolic change likely enabled the evolution of new kinds of 
individuals and new means of heredity, but did not in itself count as such, so, it is not included in 
narrow conceptions of major transitions. 
And, second, other events do count as a change in evolutionary dynamics, yet are excluded 
from being major transitions. O’Malley and Powell point to plastid acquisition: the fusion of a 
photosynthesizing cyanobacteria with a eukaryotic cell which enabled the evolution of blue-
green algae and plants. This is surely the emergence of a new kind of individual, and one with 
dramatic macro-evolutionary consequences, especially in light of the role of plants and blue-
green algae in global oxygen cycles. Yet it was excluded from early discussions (although 
Szathmary for one has since changed his mind on this). More generally speaking, given that the 
emergence of individuals typically involves overcoming cooperative challenges, and these involve 
the coupling of evolutionary fates amongst individuals, it is tempting to take many events (the 
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forming of social groups, horizontal gene transfer, etc…) as counting as the emergence of new 
individuals: but many of these stretch the notion of ‘major’ (from a macro-evolutionary 
perspective) to breaking point. 
On my view, both of these worries are over-overstated. Regarding the former, distinguish 
between the complaint that the major transitions as originally conceived are unmotivated and 
arbitrary—a ‘hodge-podge’—and the complaint that there are mistakes in which particular 
events are included or excluded from the list. Even if the exclusion of plastid acquisition was in 
error, it doesn’t follow from this that the more-or-less narrow conception of major transitions, 
focusing on individuals and heredity, is unprincipled. The list just needs to be corrected. As we’ll 
see, this is Szathmary’s recent aim. Moreover, the worry that there is no way to exclude events 
that involve new individuals, yet are microevolutionarily minor, ignore what I think is a tacit 
commitment in the original formulation of major transitions: one which focuses on outcomes. 
Sources are restricted to new forms of heredity and new individuals, and outcomes are restricted 
to major changes in macroevolutionary patterns. As I’ll discuss below, what counts as ‘major’ is 
an open question, but I see no reason for this to undermine the research program.  
I do think, then, that the two original dimensions (the emergence of new individuals and 
intergenerational pathways), if coupled with a restriction on outcomes, and when linked to a 
traditional conception of evolutionary theory, provides a kind of theoretically-unified research 
program. And indeed, I think this view is clearly present in Szathmary’s (2015) reconceptualization 
of the major transitions. As he says, 
Far from being an arbitrary collection of merely interesting anecdotes about evolution, 
transition theory has been presented as exploring the topic in two dimensions…this view 
is linked to the notion of unities of evolution that multiply, show inheritance, and have 
variability. Uniting the last two criteria in hereditary variability, one has two major 
features: the nature of multiplication and the nature of inheritance, and we investigate 
the major evolutionary transitions of these features. (10105). 
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However, even if a theoretically-unified research program is available, it doesn’t follow from 
this that this program is satisfactory. O’Malley and Powell point to biotic events which don’t fit 
within the framework and yet surely count as major events in the history of life. And although 
mass extinctions are perhaps not as dramatic as the Earth’s oxygenation, it is hard to ignore the 
end-Permian extinction’s culling of 96% of all marine species. Based on similar considerations as 
hold for the atmosphere’s oxygenation, ignoring these major biotic events in the service of 
theoretical unity looks perverse. But this complaint too is, I think, far too quick: Maynard-Smith 
and Szathmary never claimed that their conception of major transitions is intended to cover all of 
the game-changing events; just an interesting, theoretically unified sub-set of them. As we saw in 
the introduction, they explicitly do not claim exclusivity. (Similar might be said of the charge that 
the major transitions literature re-creates a ‘great chain of being’, marching to the human zenith 
of evolution. So long as the view is not taken to be exclusionary, much of this objection’s teeth 
are removed, at least in principle: it could be that in practice such conceptions encourage 
problematic thinking)4. 
On this kind of view, ‘major transitions’ is a term of art which picks out a particular, 
interesting, and theoretically unified set of events in life’s history. 
5.2 Pay-offs 
Although I think the objections considered above are unfounded, I do think there is a more 
pressing worry regarding whether the major transitions approach is, or even can, fulfil some of its 
promise. To see why, distinguish between two kinds of benefits we might gain from the major 
transitions literature5. One set concerns theoretical pay-offs: investigation of relatively narrow 
                                                           
4 I suspect that O’Malley and Powell’s objection is better put not as being about the arbitrariness or ad-
hocness of the major transitions literature, but against the conception of evolutionary theory which 
underwrites it. If the traditional idea of an evolution as fundamentally involving heritable, fitness-
enhancing traits changing populations over generations is a mistake, then perhaps so too are research 
programs led by that theory. I am far too much of a pluralist at heart to take a stand on that question.  
5 I’m grateful to Rune Nyrup for suggesting this way of putting the point.  
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conceptions of major transitions will increase our understanding of evolutionary theory. Another 
set concerns explanatory pay-offs: the idea that we will explain the actual shape of life using the 
theoretical machinery of major transitions. I think it the theoretical pay-offs have been bountiful, 
but I have doubts concerning explanatory pay-offs. As we’ll see, explanations targeting the 
traditional major transitions do not turn on the machinery of that theory-driven investigation. In 
fact, we see signs of switching from a theory-led investigation to a phenomena-led investigation. 
If how we explain major transitions as narrowly conceived doesn’t have the payoff it is supposed 
to, then the phenomena becomes, it strikes me, considerably less interesting, even by its 
proponent’s own lights. 
The benefit of the original framework wasn’t simply supposed to be identifying a 
theoretically unified set of phenomena, or an opportunity to probe and understand evolutionary 
theory, but to provision a set of common explanatory resources applicable to actual history. And 
indeed if a clean explanatory schema could be applied across the major transitions, I would be 
more amenable to excluding things like mass extinctions from the list. Brett Calcott (2011) has 
argued for explanatory ecumenism concerning major transitions: that the high-level theoretical 
explanations of the narrow conception are not in conflict with more complex specific 
explanations of particular transitions. Although his view relies on what I take to be a typical 
feature of biological explanation, that “even when we identify a particular biological 
phenomenon, we can still go about explaining it in a number of ways” (35-36), I have doubts in 
this particular instance. It looks to me as if those common explanatory resources are giving way 
to a series of much more detailed, complex explanations. That is, the simple, broad theoretical 
explanations in fact fail to explain actual transitions. A closer look at Szathmary’s reboot will 
suffice to suggest this. 
To back up these claims, I’ll turn to Szathmary’s reexamination of major transitions (2015). His 
picture still takes the transitions to be theoretically unified (or at least principled): in the face of 
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increasing complexity over evolutionary time, we posit two kinds of events which involve shifts in 
‘the rules’ of evolution. These can be explained by appeal to a set of common explanatory 
resources provided by the relatively simple models and equations of evolutionary game theory 
and the like. 
The question can justifiably be raised whether we have a theory or not. I think we do, but 
with qualifications. Theories do not have to be predictive but still can have considerable 
explanatory power… if we see, even in rudimentary form, that originally independent 
reproducing units join, somehow use functional synergies among the units, and that 
there is some novelty in the inheritance system as well, then the population is definitely 
on its way to a “major transition”. (10110). 
This gives the appearance that explanations of major transitions are what I have called 
‘simple narratives’: explanations of particular events which operate by positing a simple model 
and then demonstrating that the case in hand meets the conditions of that model (Currie 2014, 
Calcott 2011 calls these ‘broad explanatory generalizations’). In such cases, the same explanatory 
model is often applied across a range of phenomena (perhaps ala Kitcher 1981). However, in 
Szathmary’s sketch and update of major transitions, this apparent simplicity breaks down. First, 
he embraces Queller’s (1997) distinction between egalitarian and fraternal transitions (the former 
involves two different kinds of units combining, the latter units of the same type); each require 
different evolutionary mechanisms to ensure cooperation. Second, the details of how the 
transitions in fact occurred become increasingly crucial for the explanation, and so the 
theoretical model starts to fall from the explanatory picture. Take two examples: the origin of 
the eukaryotic cell and the emergence of human social groups. 
According to Szathmary, the evolution of eukaryotes is a major transition: the energetic 
advantages endowed by mitochondria allowed a larger number of genes and lower death rates, 
and thus more space for evolutionary experimentation. Thus, the space of evolution morphed 
(however, see Booth & Doolittle 2015). Moreover, it occurred via egalitarian combination. 
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However, the nature of the transition is hotly contested, and turns crucially on matters of 
phylogenetic order: whether phagocytosis and other distinctive eukaryotic features emerged 
prior to the acquisition of mitochondria or vice-versa. The details are not my concern here, but 
note that the answer to this question—critical for explaining the major transition—turns not on 
game theoretic machinery, but rather on energy demands. “The major argument against the 
phagocytosis-early scenario is once again energetic. According to this view, the boost provided 
by mitochondria not only was necessary for the evolution of very complex eukaryotic genomes, 
but also was essential for the origin of the eukaryotic condition” (10107). In other words, the 
energy-boost provisioned by mitochondria looks like a precondition for the emergence of the 
other fancy features associated with eukaryotes. The explanatory machinery applied to the 
transition turns on the energetic demands of the relevant system: it goes far beyond the 
simplicity implied by the theoretical unity of major transitions. 
Take another example: Szathmary’s discussion of the evolution of the suite of traits 
associated with the hyper-cooperative social groups distinctive of hominids. Here, he emphasizes 
the role of increased cooperation leading to the evolution of language (“with its unlimited 
hereditary potential” 10109), the role of grandmothers as carriers of both genetic and cultural 
information, and group selection as a means of further decoupling cooperation from genetic 
relatedness. As he says, 
We see key elements that are high-lighted in other transitions: cooperation (including 
reproductive leveling and food sharing), a form of sociality, a powerful novel inheritance 
system, and living in groups… It sounds just right: biology gives room to technological 
and communal cultural evolution. Due to social care (including medicine) and agriculture, 
the biology of humans has become gradually de-Darwinized. It is culture where the main 
action is going on. (10110). 
To my mind, this explanation diverges far from positing the emergence of a new hereditary 
mechanism or evolutionary individual in light of quashing evolutionary pressures against 
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cooperation. Instead, a complex battery of both particular details about hominid evolution (the 
evolution of grandmothers, the particular timing of language evolving) are interwoven with  the 
models of evolutionary theory to generate a complex narrative. Theory plays important roles, but 
it does not lead: relevance is set by the event itself, be it hominid evolution or the emergence of 
eukaryotes. The main action lies in the phenomena. 
Recall that evidential relevance tells between phenomena-led and theory-led investigation: in 
distinguishing the two, we ask whether relevance turns on relationship to theory, or to 
phenomena. In Szathmary’s discussion relevance does not turn on testing theoretical machinery, 
or applying that machinery to particular cases. If it did, then the energy demands of phagocytosis 
or the role of grandmothers in hominid social groups would be irrelevant. Rather, relevance is set 
by the particular phenomena targeted: the evolution of hominid-style cooperation, or the 
emergence of the prokaryotic cell. The simple, model-based narratives give way to complex, 
detailed narratives6. There is no problem with this in and of itself (I would be tempted to call it an 
improvement) but it does undermine Szathmary’s claims to theoretical unity. The course of 
investigation bucks attempts to maintain the theoretical and explanatory advantages which 
supposedly justify retaining a narrow conception of major transitions. The explanatory pay-offs 
of major transitions as narrowly conceived, then, have been overstated. 
5.3 Are Mass Extinctions Major Transitions? 
Hopefully you won’t be too disappointed to learn that the answer to whether mass 
extinctions are major transitions is: it depends. Let’s summarize the arguments of this section 
thus far. There are theoretically principled ways of delineating major transitions by restricting 
both sources and outcomes. Any theoretically unified way of carving up the space is likely to 
                                                           
6 Indeed, according to Currie (2014) the shift from simple to complex narratives is a common feature of 
progress in historical sciences.  
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exclude biotic events which made a crucial macroevolutionary difference; this shouldn’t be 
surprising, as being exhaustive was never part of the major transitions project. However,  if 
Szathmary’s development is representative, claims to theoretical and explanatory unity are 
undermined as the details of particular cases swamp the apparent simplicity of the abstract 
explanatory schemas which motivated the project in the first place.  
It strikes me that a natural response to this is to accept that what counts as a major transition 
is to at least some extent context sensitive7. In particular, answering whether some phenomenon 
is a major transition requires specifying a set of sources and a set of outcomes. Coarsely, do we 
mean major transitions in a narrow, or a broad, sense? The accounts of major transitions that I 
have surveyed discount major extinctions and yet, if we are sufficiently permissive on the 
outcome side, it is plausible that the occurrence of mass extinctions,  in virtue of their influence 
on life’s shape, can be viewed as major transitions. However, as discussed above, they are not 
likely to be theoretically unified: investigation of mass extinctions have followed the same 
pattern as we saw in Szathmary’s development of major transitions. They call for detailed, 
complex explanations.  
That is, we have on our hands a phenomena-led investigation. Which leads us to ask: what is 
the benefit of such investigations? Why not simply prefer the theoretical unity and simple 
narratives of either the original view or a more restricted set of sources (such as transitions in 
individuality)? I’ve previously argued that the world’s complexity forces us into complex 
explanations (Currie 2014). Here, I want to say something more positive. I’ll demonstrate a crucial 
advantage of phenomena-led investigation: it allows a wider scope of information to be relevant. 
As such, I’ll argue, it plays a crucial role in the investigative strategies which allow historical 
scientists to succeed despite the apparent paucity and incompleteness of their evidence.  To 
show this, I want to first consider another set of (perhaps major) transitions of intimate concern 
                                                           
7 I’m unsure whether this context sensitivity is more radical than O’Malley & Powell’s proposal.  
24 
 
to paleobiologists, but traditionally not part of the canon: the evolution of limb morphology. 
Second, I’ll connect phenomena-led investigation to Chapman & Wylie’s account of success in 
archaeology. 
6. Major Transitions in Paleobiology 
I want to claim that phenomena-led investigations are a feature of the strategies 
paleobiologists adopt when gaining empirical traction on deep time, so it is crucial to see that my 
point is not restricted to the corner of paleobiology concerning mass extinctions. As such, in this 
section I want to present another paleontological case study where (1) the investigative target 
has some claim to being a major transition insofar as it is a biotic event the occurrence of which 
made a difference to macroevolutionary pattern, (2) the investigation is phenomena-led. I’ll 
emphasize how the phenomena-led character of the investigation enables the relevance of a vast 
array of empirical information. This evidential plurality, I’ll argue, is a major benefit of adopting a 
phenomena-led strategy. 
Vertebrate paleobiologists often focus on ‘organogenesis’, the evolution of the vertebrate 
limb. The transformation from fins to limbs enabled the flourishing of terrestrial vertebrate life; 
the transformation from forelimbs into wings enabled their taking to the skies. Here, I want to 
focus on an apparently more humble transition: from median to paired fins. There is a lot to be 
said about explanations of evolutionary novelty, and the relationship between paleobiology and 
evolutionary developmental biology, but here is not the place. The point of the example is to 
demonstrate another paleobiological investigation which is phenomena-led and highlight that 
phenomena-led investigations maximize evidence plurality. 
Agnatha such as lampreys and hag-fishes are extant reminders of the primitive, jawless state 
from which more derived fish (including ourselves) evolved. These critters sport fins, but they are 
‘median’ fins: lined along the fish’s back. 
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Figure 1: Lamprey showing unpaired fins (Wikimedia Commons) 
In derived fish, some fins are paired: instead of aligning along the back, they are partnered 
and jut out horizontally. 
 
Figure 2 Hector's Lanternfish with paired pectoral (1) and pelvic (2) fins. Wikimedia Commons 
This change is not minor, evolutionarily speaking: “The evolution of paired appendages in the 
stem gnathostomes enabled more sophisticated control of movement and, subsequently, the 
development of a diverse array of complex fins and tetrapod limbs” (Sansom et al 2013). The 
transition to paired fins, then, was a biotic event which opened up rich new territory for 
evolution to explore and lineages to take advantage of: a hallmark of a major transition. But how 
did it occur? 
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Two hypotheses, both with histories reaching into the 19th Century (Coates 2003), compete to 
explain the evolution of paired fins. One takes pectoral fins to have evolved from the gill arch. Gill 
arches are bony structures which support a fish’s gills. On the ‘gill-arch hypothesis’ the posterior-
most arch was a precursor to paired fins, gradually evolving a new function. The other, the ‘fin-
fold’ hypothesis, notes the existence of lateral ‘folds’ in embrological development, which could 
have been co-opted for fin development. Both hypotheses provide narratives explaining how 
paired fins could evolve from the primitive state (what Brett Calcott 2009 has called ‘lineage 
explanations’).  
 
Figure 3: Two hypotheses concerning the evolution of paired fins. (A) The gill-arch hypothesis. (B) The fin-fold 
hypothesis (detail from Pieretti et al 2015, fig 1) 
Pieretti et al (2015) summarize how the hypotheses were first developed in light of 
embryological studies of sharks, and how “evidence accumulated over the past 120 years has 
helped evaluate these two hypotheses and assess new fossil, developmental, and molecular data 
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from a variety of species that combine to reveal a third scenario for the origins of paired fins” 
(4872). They discuss a smorgasbord of evidence. This evidence includes studies of morphological 
similarity: for instance, the similarity between gill structures and pectoral girdles (which support 
paired fins) in sharks is taken to favour the gill-arch hypothesis. It includes molecular 
developmental evidence: Gillis et al (2009) experimentally demonstrate significant overlap 
between the genetic controls of fin development and gill development in skates (again 
supporting the gill-arch hypothesis). It includes evidence from the fossil record: early sharks have 
a gill structure akin to that of bony fishes, suggesting that current similarities between their 
paired fins and gills are derived features and thus no guide to their evolution. It includes 
comparative evidence: a central pillar in the fin-fold hypothesis are the morphological similarities 
between median and paired fins, making it plausible that the embryological folds which lead to 
median fins could be co-opted for paired fins. And it includes molecular evidence: phylogenetic 
trees of extant fish derived from molecular data play a crucial role in framing the hypotheses.  
The fossil record is particularly important for informing us about the evolutionary plasticity of 
the traits in question. Sansom et al 2013, for instance, discovered a Devonian jawless fish with 
paired anal fins—a feature not seen before in extant or extinct critters. This potentially suggests 
a plastic ‘exploratory’ period in early fish fin morphology before the standard bony-fish body plan 
stabilized. Relatedly, Pieretti et al report the fin-folds of early jawed fish are unevenly distributed 
phylogenetically, suggesting that they are instances of convergent evolution. If fin morphology 
and development was significantly more plastic in the past than they are now, then identifying a 
clear path of transformation from basal to derived states is much trickier.  
The suggestion that paired fins (of varying kinds) might have evolved many times during this 
period raises an important question about the nature of major transitions. Major transitions are 
often taken to be contingent, chancy events which profoundly changed life’s shape. Typically 
evolutionary biologists take these to be due to the arrival of a new variant, while at least 
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sometimes paleobiologists blame the pruning of once diverse variants (consider Gould’s 1990 
suggestion that the chancy survival of Pikiaia and the chancy extinction of other critters from the 
Cambrian made all the difference). However, if paired fins were an event waiting to happen, a 
‘good trick’ given the evolutionary context of aquatic vertebrate-hood, then they may well not 
have been contingent in that sense. In the spirit of context-sensitivity about major transitions, I 
won’t here commit to whether contingency is necessary for them or not. 
Regardless of contingency, this is a beautiful illustration of the opportunism (‘methodological 
omnivorism’, Currie 2018) of paleobiologists: by assaying a wide variety of evidential sources, and 
adapting knowledge-generating tools to local conditions, they build rich and sophisticated 
hypotheses concerning the past. More crucially for our purposes, however, this is clearly a 
phenomena-led investigation. What makes these varied data relevant is not their relationship to 
some theory, but their relationship to hypotheses specifically pertaining to particular 
phenomena. Both mass extinctions and organogenesis, then, are clear examples of 
paleobiologists adopting phenomena-led investigations8. It is time to connect this observation 
with paleobiological success. 
7. The Paradox of Material Evidence 
Alison Wylie has emphasized the capacity of material remains in archaeology to be 
epistemically transformative: archaeological objects frequently refuse to bow to our theoretical 
expectations (2002). With Bob Chapman, she develops this as the ‘paradox of material evidence’ 
                                                           
8 A reviewer keenly asks whether the conceptual machinery of the major transitions literature has been 
incorporated into the methodological omnivory of paleobiology. Certainly to some extent: game theory 
and population genetics have always played a role in paleobiology. Although I haven’t looked 
systematically, my hunch is that this machinery is more often used to highlight explanatory targets for 
paleobiological investigation than to directly inform reconstruction. For instance, a recent collection on 
‘major transitions’ in paleoanthropology certainly takes the notion in a broad sense (Foley et al 2016). The 
articles pick out potential game-changers (the use of stone tools, differences in maturation age between 
hominids and close relatives, developmental plasticity, etc…), only a few are plausibly tied to the narrow 
definition above, and although narrow transitions might frame the discussions, they tend to take a back 
seat. 
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(2016).  The paradox emphasises the transience and incompleteness of archaeological evidence 
on the one hand, and its capacity to be a fulcrum around which archaeological hypotheses turn 
nonetheless: “... how stubbornly recalcitrant these data can be, no matter how entrenched their 
assumed meaning...” (Chapman & Wylie, 2016, 5). 
This is a feature of paleobiology too. Although some areas, most notably invertebrate 
paleobiology, are increasingly marked by large data sets, significant areas of the discipline still 
remain trace-poor. Yet the capacity of material remains to be transformative is maintained. 
Under the right conditions, single, incomplete finds can underwrite well-founded, bold claims 
(such as single mammalian teeth being sufficient to identify hitherto unknown genus, see Currie 
2018, chapter 1). Under the right conditions, the discovery of new traces can act as ‘smoking 
guns’, strongly favouring one hypothesis over another (Cleland 2002, 2011). Like archaeology, it is 
a prima facie mystery how paleobiological evidence, incomplete, biased and degraded as it may 
be, is able to carry us so far into the past.  
Chapman and Wylie resolve the paradox by denying that archaeology has solid, immutable 
foundations in the sense of their being self-warranting, instead arguing that the foundations of 
reconstruction and interpretation are provisional and dynamic. The idea is that theory in 
archaeology doesn’t play the kind of overarching, determining, role that it might in other 
disciplines. As Wylie says, 
Evidential claims may never figure as incontrovertible epistemic foundations, but they do 
function as a scaffolding, a contingent stopping point in warranting arguments. The 
question to ask of them is not whether they meet an ideal standard of epistemic 
infallibility, but how to make best use of the resources at hand to adjudicate their 
credibility. (Wylie 2011, 380). 
And with Chapman, 
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Neither these data nor the evidential claims based on them constitute a self-warranting 
empirical foundation, and yet they can powerfully challenge and constrain the 
reconstructive and explanatory claims we project onto the cultured past. (Chapman & 
Wylie 2016, 6). 
In other words, it is because there is no ultimate, stable foundation—that the discussion 
between theory and material remains is dynamic and two-directional—that archaeological (and, I 
suggest, paleontological) remains are able to speak. Seeing that paleobiological (and, 
presumably, archaeological) investigations are phenomena-led, I think, deepens Chapman & 
Wylie’s point. 
Phenomena-led investigations are such because the relevance of evidence turns on 
relationships between phenomena and hypotheses pertaining to them; evidence is relevant to 
theory-led investigations in virtue of relationship with theory. Theories are often explored and 
tested by being concretized in simple systems: both computational models and controlled 
experimental systems (see, for instance, Currie forthcoming). Due to theory’s abstractness and 
precision, the relevance of actual, longitudinal empirical detail gathered from observations of 
natural phenomena is often limited. Moreover, the explanations provisioned are, if not ‘how 
possibly’ than at least concerned with a modal breadth that outpaces the actual history of life, or 
nearby counterfactuals concerning it. As such, the range of potential evidence pertaining to the 
phenomena of macroevolutionary pattern differs (and is of a different nature) from the range of 
potential evidence pertaining to evolutionary theories of individuality and heredity. 
There is an asymmetry, then, between theory-led and phenomena-led investigations. Where 
the latter is of limited value to the former, the lessons, evidence and perspectives of the former 
are often happily relevant to the latter. We saw this in Szathmary’s updated discussion of the 
major transitions: although the explanations have become significantly more detailed and 
disunified, they have not jettisoned the modelling approaches so constitutive of the original 
approach to major transitions. Rather, they are integrated into complex narratives, and 
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supported on the basis of a ‘confluence’ of differing evidence (Currie 2018, chapter 6). Theories, 
for phenomena-led investigations, do not form a fundamental, unquestioned and unquestionable 
basis, then, but as Wylie emphasizes, play supporting, scaffolding, and warranting roles.  
The upshot of this is that phenomena-led investigations have a potentially larger base of 
relevant evidence than theory-led investigations. I’m not sure whether this is true in principle, but 
if the case studies we’ve looked at here are any guide, it is at least frequently the case. Given that 
paleobiologists and other historical scientists often face limited evidence, and tend to adopt 
consilience-based, multiple-lines-of-evidence strategies in light of this (Forber & Griffith 2011), 
phenomena-led investigations are a good strategy as they maximize the amount and variety of 
evidence. 
It is pursuing phenomena-led investigations, then, which enables historical scientists to adopt 
the opportunistic, pluralistic and methodologically omnivorous strategy which underwrites their 
success. Further, because phenomena-led investigations treat theory not as a fundamental 
bedrock but rather place it in a supporting role in helping characterize, evidence and explain 
target phenomena, they enable the solution to the paradox of material evidence Chapman & 
Wylie sketch. Material remains are resistant to theory because the structure of paleobiological 
and archaeological investigation involves provisional theory; it is phenomena-led. 
8. Conclusion 
Major transitions are not natural kinds. There is no foreordained set of moments which count 
as ‘major’ abstracted from investigative context: even if the evolution of paired fins was not 
game-changing at the scale of the great oxygenation event or the emergence of eukaryotes, it 
unquestionably changed the game vis-à-vis the radiation and history of vertebrates. Indeed, I 
don’t need to see the history of life as a march towards the apex of humanity to see the mass 
extinction at the close of the Cretaceous as a momentous event which profoundly affected life’s 
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shape. Which restrictions we should place on the sources and the outcomes of transitions turns 
in part on what we’re interested in and other features of our investigative context .  
I have suggested that much paleobiological evidence is irrelevant to the major transitions 
literature. This is surprising. You might be wondering: do I want to say that the latter is, properly-
speaking, autonomous of the former? Not necessarily. There are some discussions which suggest 
that paleobiology and neontology ought to be integrated in various ways – for instance that 
paleobiology deserves a seat at the ‘high table’ of evolutionary theory (Sepkoski & Ruse 2009); 
while others have suggested that paleobiology and evolutionary theory provide autonomous 
explanations (Grantham 1999). I’ll close by drawing on Angela Potochnik’s work to sketch a fairly 
conciliatory relationship between the two. 
Potochnik (2010) argues that the optimality approach characteristic of population genetics, 
and the more mechanistic strategy of evolutionary developmental biology, have independent 
explanatory goals. Where the former aims to explain how fitter traits become prevalent in a 
population over generations, the latter aims to explain how traits might (or might not) arise over 
evolutionary time. As such, different features matter, and so the details relevant for one purpose 
can often be black-boxed when pursuing another. I think a similar thing might be said concerning 
the relationship between traditional major transitions and mass extinctions. Accounting for a 
major transition involves explaining how a population could shift from being a border -line 
evolutionary individual to a paradigm evolutionary individual. Such explanations are abstracted 
from, for instance, the extinction events that may have triggered or enabled them (the 
relationship is not symmetrical, however: explanations of mass extinctions sometimes appeal to 
theories and models which are the bread-and-butter of major transitions).  
However, Potochnik argues that population genetics and evolutionary developmental 
biology are interdependent epistemically. Sometimes, what goes on in the black boxes matters 
to whether a particular explanation is true: so, it might be that the applicability of major 
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transition explanations turns on the details of the fossil record. This in itself suggests something 
about the integration of paleontological evidence and evolutionary theory. 
On my view, the major transitions literature, in virtue of the being theory-led, need not 
incorporate paleontological perspectives into its explanations. However, paleontological data 
might have an epistemic role to play in constraining and determining the applicability or truth of 
those explanations. Consider a set of closely related questions about when, how, and through 
what mechanism transitions have occurred. In answering these questions, it strikes me that 
paleobiological perspectives, and potentially mass extinctions, are crucial.  And indeed, I bet that 
investigations into major transitions are shifting into such a phenomena-led key. Perhaps 
ultimately, whether we think mass extinctions should be counted as major transitions should turn 
on how that integrative project goes. If it turns out that mass extinction events play a crucial 
enabling, triggering, or other-wise difference-making role in the occurrence of major transitions, 
then perhaps their majorness should be taken seriously even in that context. 
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